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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to establish the disposition espoused by international law with 
regard to same sex unions. Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights contains an express right to marry. This dissetiation analyses this provision, other 
United Nations human rights treaties, and relevant jurisprudence to determine whether att 23 
applies to same-sex couples. In the only authoritative interpretation of art 23, Joslin v New 
Zealand, the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that it does not apply to same-
sex couples. However, that decision is more than 12 years old and arguably would not be 
decided in the same way should a similar case come before the Human Rights Committee in 
the future. Using the principles of treaty interpretation, this dissertation assetts that Joslin v 
New Zealand is no longer good law, and concludes that the right to marry should be interpreted 
in a non-discriminatory manner and should not be restricted exclusively to opposite-sex 
couples. Moreover, this dissertation juxtaposes the United Nations framework to the European 
one in so for as the LGBTQI agenda is concerned. 
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1.1 Background of Problem 
The recent ruling in ObergefeLL v Hodges, saw the legalization of sa'!ne sex marriages in the 
United States of America. I Naturally, the ruling had repercussions that resonated across the 
globe. These repercussions present valid, somewhat blatant questions not only within the 
jurisdiction within which the ruling was made but also in other jurisdictions. The ripples caused 
by the Obergefell ruling indicate that matrimonial union is a matter of great consequence to 
many. Why is this so? Is it possible that marriage is a concept rooted in man by virtue of 
existence thus indicating a primal need to form such unions? Or is it because marriage serves 
a range of functional purposes that have been brought about by social constructivism such as 
the expression of individual autonomy, the safeguarding of proprietary rights through 
succession and so on. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that men and women 
of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry 
and to found a family. 2 Moreover, mticle 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights states the right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found 
a family shall be recognized.3 What are the true implications of these provisions? Answering 
this question would certainly aid in demystifying questions that have plagued the concept of 
marriage such as a justification for or against marriage equality. So to speak is the right to 
marriage gender specific? And is disallowing marriage equality in international law tantamount 
to discrimination? These represent a pottion ofthe primary concerns that will be addressed in 
this dissertation. 
In Joslin v New Zealand, the Human Rights Committee interpreted the ICCPR provision on 
the right to marriage contemplating if the right to marry included same sex couples. It was 
concluded tl_1at the atticle only protects heterosexual couples. 4 Domestic courts, treaty 
committees, charter-based bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, and civil 
1 James Obergefell, et al, Petitioners v Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al 
2 Art 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 
3 Article 23(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 17·1 
4 Joslin v New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 
1 
society have all proffered various interpretations of Article 23 . Moreover, the recent years have 
seen an increase in the number of states that recognise the right of same-sex couples to marry 
within their national legal systems starting with Netherlands in 200 I. Thereafter, states such as 
Canada, South AJiica, the United States, Denmark, Brazil and France followed suit. Therefore, 
it would be precise to conclude that the right to marry is protected under art 23(2) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but the question of whether this right 
includes same-sex couples remains open to interpretation. 
Lastly, the subject of discrimination is broached by scrutinizing general comment No 20. of 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It espouses that non-
discrimination and equality are fundamental components of international human rights law and 
essential to the exercise and enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. 5 When read 
with article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which 
obliges each state patty to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant without 
discrimination on sex; themes of discrimination against same sex couples become apparent. 
1.2 Hypothesis 
The UN human rights system has interpreted the right to marriage narrowly to exclude same 
sex marriage, leading to the discrimination of same sex couples 
The progressive interpretation of international human rights provisions along the lines of what 
is embodied in European jurisprudence will lead to the attainment ofmarriage equality. 
1.3 Research Questions 
This dissertation will investigate two principle questions. The first regards the disposition that 
International law upholds regarding the right to marriage with specific regard to same-sex 
couples both in its transcribed form and in its applied form (interpretation). What rationale 
informs this disposition? Is there a more progressive way of applying the provisions? The 
second regards the concept of discrimination. So to speak, is the non-recognition of same sex 
marriage tantamount to discrimination? 
I. 4 Justification of the study 
The justification of this study is apparent in themes concerning justice and equality. So to 
speak, equality is pegged on the premise that all human beings are equal in the eyes of the law 
and that they are entitled to the enjoyment of those rights. Therefore, the findings of this 
5 General comment No 20. of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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dissertation would be very crucial to establishing whether there are indeed some people 
pm1icularly same sex couples whose enjoyment of the right to marriage is being curtailed. 
Moreover, the imp011ance of marriage is blatant in society. So to speak, depending on the 
jurisdiction, the institution of marriage affords the population certain privileges beyond mutual 
romantic interest. It is also a legal contract that confers special rights and responsibilities to the 
parties involved. For instance in some jurisdictions, married patiners are not bound by hospital 
visitation restrictions and are eligible for certain survivor benefits when the other one dies. 
It is also apparent that marriage bears a connection to propetiy law and also affords certain 
benefits to the patties. In some jurisdictions marriage affords tax benefits such as marital tax 
deductions and the allowance for married couples to file taxes jointly. Moreover, it also has 
health insurance and employment benefits such as allowing spouses to use each other's health 
insurance and allowing leave benefits such as family leave. Lastly there is also the matter of 
inheritance. So to speak, even in the absence of a will a spouse will still have inheritance rights 
in case one of them passes on. However, it is also important to take into considerations that 
certain jurisdictions provide for the concept of civil unions which are quite similar to marital 
umons. 
Therefore, the right to marriage is a crucial to humanity and it is impotiant that all men and 
women are able to enjoy it equally. A limitation based on gender would be tantamount to 
discrimination. 
1.5 Theoretical Frame·work 
According to Paula Gerber, the incorporation of the right to same-sex marriage is rising trend 
pat1icularly among western states. However, this progression towards marriage equality that is 
apparent in multiple domestic jurisdictions is not being mimicked within international human 
rights law. This fact is evidenced by the fact that the ruling in Joslin v New Zealand is the only 
United Nations authority that addresses the application of Atiicle 23 of the ICCPR. Regarding 
the adoption of marriage equa lity laws by multiple western states and a few other states situated 
across the globe, it is crucial to consider also that the number of countries that have marriage 
equality is relatively lower compared to the number of countries that still crin1inalise 
homosexual conduct.6 10 percent of the globe's population is estimated to reside in states that 
6 https: //antigaylaws.org/ on 28 November 2017, Paula Gerber: An overview of Countries That Still Criminalise 
Homosexuality 
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have legalised same sex marriage.7 In her article, Paul Gerber opmes that the growing 
international climate of support for LGBTI human rights generally, and same-sex marriage in 
particular, suggest that there exists a high possibility of the question ofthe legitimacy of same-
sex marriage coming before a UN treaty body again in the fi.tture . Moreover, since the Human 
Rights Commission's decision in Joslin v New Zealand, the UN treaty body system has 
increasingly defended the rights of LGBTQI people in its General Comments, Concluding 
Observations and Views on individual communications. 
The subject of marriage equality broaches the issue of social inclusion which ties into the bigger 
conversation of discrimination. M. V. Lee Badget conducts a study that contemplates social 
inclusion and the value of marriage equality in Massachusetts and the Netherlands. It attempts 
to delineate what social inclusion entails with specific regard to marriage equality and also the 
potential impact of non-inclusion on societies with LGBTQI communities. The journal 
suggests that policy fi·ameworks should take into account other factors that might affect the 
actual degree of inclusion felt by individuals, such as attitudes toward LGBT people or the 
larger context of social inequality related to race and class. In other words, public policies that 
allow more individuals access to imp01tant institutions, such as marriage, are important and 
necessary first steps but are not sufficient actions for full inclusion. 8 Therefore, even within the 
conversation of marriage equality it is important to consider what the repercussions of non-
inclusion are and whether it is tantamount to discrimination. 
The European Court for Human Rights has ruled that same-sex marriages are not considered a 
human right, making it clear that homosexual partnerships do not in fact equal marriages 
between a man and a woman in European Human Rights Law. This was apparent in Schalk 
and Kopf v Austria, where the comt found no violation of the applicant ' s human rights, 
although there was dissention on the issue of discrimination. 9 In the case the applicants alleged 
that the legal impossibility for them to get married constituted a violation of their constitutional 
right to respect for private and family life and of the principle of non-discrimination. An 
analysis of European Human Rights law and the rationale employed in arriving at a conclusion 
7h ttps:/ /ww\Y. gavsta rn ews. com/article/ I 0-war I d%E2%80%99s-popu I ati on-now-I i ves-under-m arri age-
equality030714/ on 28 November 2017, Andrew Potts: I 0% of th e World 's Population Now Lives under Marriage 
Equality', Gay Star News 
8 M. V. Lee Badget, 'Social Inclusion and the Value of Marriage Equality in Massachusetts and the Netherlands' 
Journal of Social Issues (20 II), 316-334 
9 Schalk and Kopfv Austria ECtHR Application no. 30141 /04 
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that would limit marriage to heterosexual couples would certainly aid in the objective of this 
disse11ation. 
1.6 Research Methodology and Approach 
In order to conclusively determine the status of the right to marriage for same sex couples on 
the international platform, this study will employ an array of primary, secondary and te11iary 
sources of literature. These aforementioned sources will include international 
treaties/convention, case law, journals, dissertations that have handled the subject of marriage 
equality, general comments by treaty bodies, books, concluding observations by treaty bodies 
and views on individual conmmnications also by treaty bodies. Additionally a comparative 
study delineating the disposition adhered to in European Human Rights Law with regard to the 
subject of marriage equality will also be employed . The rationale behind this disposition will 
also be examined. 
The approach that will be employed will be a comparative study and a case study. The case 
study approach will be exceedingly apparent in Chapter 2 while the comparative study will for 
the most pa11 be employed in Chapter 3. This approach is necessary in that particular order 
because a case study would inform the comparative study. So to speak, it would be impo11ant 
to first establish a general idea ofhow the system works before comparing it to another system. 
I. 7 Assumptions 
Naturally the major assumption is that international law does indeed provide for the right to 
marriage. However, international law might also possess a bias in its interpretation by limiting 
the application ofthis right to heterosexual unions. Certainly, this could also not be the case. 
On the contrary International law could be an avid proponent of marriage equality. Lastly it 
could also likely be a matter of legal ambivalence. So to speak the ideas, ideologies and 
rationale that inform the right to marriage on the international platform could be riddled with 
contradiction and indecision. This legal shall attempt to establish the true disposition espoused 
by international law regarding marriage equality. 
1.8 Chapter Breakdown 
The objectives of this dissertation shall be met within four distinct chapters with each 
comprising a particular dimension of marriage equality. Chapter 1 will be the introductory 
chapter. It will delineate the background to the problem, the research problem, the theoretical 
framework, the hypothesis, the research questions, the methodology and approach and the 
chapter layout. Chapter 2 will identify the discriminatory interpretation that is abided by in the 
5 
UN Treaty system and outline the provisions concern ing the right to marriage in International 
Human Rights law. So to speak, it will identify the provisions that regard marriage in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and any other relevant international human rights instruments. Moreover, this chapter 
shall contemplate the notion of interpretation of these international provisions. So to speak, it 
shall identifY the current discriminatory interpretation that is abided with regard to same-sex 
marriage. It shall also examine the rationale behind this interpretation that is currently in use. 
In essence, it shall highlight the theme of discrimination that is apparent in not granting same 
sex couples the right to marriage. Chapter 3 will concern a comparative study with the 
European Human Rights Jurisdiction, which does not consider same sex marriage to be an 
enforceable right. However, in examining the rationale behind this position in European 
Human Rights Law, new elements are certain to emerge. Moreover the environment 
surrounding same sex marriage in Kenya shall be examined just to discern the disposition born 
by the Kenyan law with regard to the subject and gauge any progress that has been made in the 
field. Chapter 4 will conclude the dissertation by answering the research questions, confirming 
the hypothesis and proffering recommendations. It shall also highlight other potential modes 
of interpretation that would achieve a progressive outcome 
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CHAPTER 2 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SAME SEX COUPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
Equality is certainly a core tenet of the human rights agenda. It is the proclamation of the fact 
that all human beings are equal and have equal rights in the eyes of the law. Equality is pegged 
on rights or entitlements that all human beings and sovereign states have. Legal rights comprise 
a cluster of claims, powers and immunities. The fact that a person has a right imposes a duty 
on another to refi·ain fi·om interfering with that right . lt also entails duties on the state for 
instance to ensure the enjoyment of those rights by its citizens. In this case if same sex marriage 
is indeed an inherent right, then it ought to be protected by the state and all other persons and 
entities to refi·ain fi·om interfering with other individual ' s enjoyment ofthis right. This broaches 
the subject of justice. So to speak, in a society of equal persons what are the guiding or 
regulatory principles to ensure fairness for all and more importantly is the lack of recognition 
of same sex unions as legitimate marriages a violation of human rights? 
Therefore, as stated by Ban-Ki Moon in a video to the Human Rights Council Meeting on 
violence and discrimination, it is crucial to understand that people's lives are at stake and 
therefore there exists a dire need to have a dialogue around these issues. Naturally sexual 
orientation and gender identity are very sensitive issues and most do not grow up talking about 
these issues. 10 However by virtue ofthe United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration 
ofHuman Rights it is every human being 's duty to get involved and engage in the discussion. 
In this chapter, this dissertation shall both posit and prove that the interpretation employed by 
the UN human rights system with regard to the right to marriage is discrin1inatory to same sex 
couples. It shall do this by first, looking into the historical development of sexual minority 
rights within the international law framework in order to contextualize the discussion. 
Secondly, it shall conduct an analysis of the ICCPR, UDHR and look into the matter of treaty 
interpretation. Thereafter, it shall address the matter of treaty interpretation in light of the 
judgment proffered in the Joslin v New Zealand case. Lastly it shall discuss the notion of 
1 0https:/ /w\ vw. un. ore/sf!! en/ con ten t/sg/statemen t/20 12-03-07 I secretarv-genera Is-video-message-h uman-ri gilts-
council-meeting on 8th January 2018 , Ban-Ki Moon: Secretary-General 's video message to Human Rights 
Council meeting on Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity 
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discrimination apparent not only in disallowing same sex marriage but also in proffering civil 
unions as an alternative to marriage for same sex couples. 
2.2 Historical development of sexual minority rights in International Law 
The beginnings of international human rights law can be traced to World War II. So to speak, 
the need for an international human rights regime became apparent following the atrocities of 
the World War. Discrimination based on myriad of grounds such as race, .colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prope1ty and birth or other status 
found a place in international law. However, it would seem that sexual orientation did not. This 
lack of acknowledgment of matters regarding sexual orientation is evidenced by the fact that 
none of the human rights instruments explicitly prohibits discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Moreover, it is evidenced by the fact that the right to marry and found a family is 
reserved for only ' men and women' of marriageable age. 11 
Within the UN Human Rights system the concept of rights were fmally given new meaning. 
So to speak, concepts such as 'faith in fimdamental human rights, in the dignity and wo1th of 
the human person' and 'in the equal rights of men and women' are reafftrmedY The UN 
Charter further assigns the UN the task of maintaining international peace and security, 
achieving international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights 
and for fundamental fi·eedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 13 
2.3 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that: 
l. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall 
be recognized. 14 
11 Article 23(2), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
12 Preamble, para 2 UN Charter 
13 Art I (3) UN Charter 
14 Article 23 , International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
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In interpreting the right to marry, and whether its scope could extend to same-sex couples, it is 
impotiant to take note of the preamble of the [CCPR and the maxim of non-discrimination 
which is enunciated both as a stand-alone human right and as part of the right to marry. 15 The 
preamble provides that the purpose ofthe ICCPR is to recognize ' the inherent dignity and the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members ofthe human family ' . The right to marry received 
its most prominent and fi·equently cited interpretation in the Human Rights Conunittee ' s 
decision in Joslin v New Zealand. The key question in that case was whether the right to marry 
in article 23 included same-sex couples. The HRC determined that the article protects only 
heterosexual couples. The rationale behind the decision has been criticized for its brevity and 
its inconsistency with both the doctrine of interpretation established by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law ofTreaties 16 and norms ofhuman rights treaty interpretation previously employed 
by the HRC itself 17 However, the Joslin v New Zealand interpretation of the right to marry 
remains authoritative opinion, and is commonly cited in documents on international human 
rights norms with regards to sexual orientation and gender identity. As such, a detailed analysis 
of the opinion in the case is required in order to determine whether this is a decision made on 
solid foundations or one that should not be relied upon in the future . 
2. 4 Joslin v New Zealand 
The case concerned two lesbian couples; Ms. Joslin and Ms. Rowan who commenced a lesbian 
relationship in January 1988 and Ms. Zelf and Ms. Pearl who had conunenced a lesbian 
relationship in April 1993. In their relationships, both couples had jointly assumed 
responsibility for their children out of previous marriages. Also they had resided together, 
pooled their fmances and jointly owned a home. Moreover, both couples had maintained sexual 
relations until the point at which they made their applications. On 4 December 1995, the former 
couple applied under the Marriage Act 1955 to the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages for a marriage licence, by lodging a notice of intended marriage at the local Registry 
Office. However, the application was rejected by the Deputy Registrar-General on 14 
December 1995. Similarly, the latter couple, Ms Zelf and Ms Pearl, lodged a notice of intention 
15 Preamble, ICCPR 
16 Vienna Convention, 27 January 19801155 UNTS 331 
17 Sarah Joseph, ' Human Rights Committee: Recent Cases' Human Rights Law Review (2003), 91 , 
Paula Gerber and Melissa Castan (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Human Rights Law in Australia (Thomson 
Reuters 2013) 199-202 
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to marry at another Registry Office. On 12 February 1996, the Registrar-General informed 
them that the notice could not be processed stating that the Registrar was acting lawfully in 
interpreting the Marriage Act as confined to marriage between a man and a woman. 
All the parties thereupon applied to the High Court for a declaration that, as lesbian couples, 
they were lawfully entitled to obtain a marriage licence and to marry pursuant to the Marriage 
Act 1955. The High Court declined the application. Observing inter alia that the text ofat1icle 
23 , paragraph 2, ofthe Covenant "does not point to same-sex marriages", the Court held that 
the statutory language ofthe Marriage Act was clear in apply ing to marriage between a man 
and a woman only. 
At the Cout1 of Appeal, the applicant ' s claims were once again rejected with the Court stating 
unanimously that the Marriage Act, in its terms, clearly applied to marriage between a man and 
a woman only. A majority of the Court further went on to hold that the restriction in the 
Marriage Act of marriage to a man and a woman did not constitute discrimination. Justice Keith 
particularly expressed the majority's views at length, fmding no suppot1 in the scheme and text 
ofthe Covenant, the Committee's prior jurisprudence, the travaux preparatoires nor scholarly 
writing for the proposition that a limitation of marriage to a man and a woman violated the 
covenant. 
The couples then proceeded to sue New Zealand before the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee claiming that the country's ban on same-sex marriage violated the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The HRC concluded, in a brief three-paragraph analysis, that at1 23 of the ICCPR does not 
protect the rights of same-sex couples to marry. It then summarily dismissed all the other 
alleged violations ofthe ICCPR, stating that: 
In light ofthe scope of the right to marry under article 23, paragraph 2, of 
the Covenant, the Committee cannot find that by mere refusal to provide for 
marriage between homosexual couples, the State party has violated the 
rights of the authors under articles 16, 17, 23, paragraphs I and 2, or 26 of 
the Covenant18 
18 Joslin v New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/902/ 1999 
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The HRC, using a semantic interpretation of the text, found that the use of the phrase 'men and 
women' in art 23(2), rather than the gender-neutral terminology used elsewhere in the ICCPR; 
'every human being', ' everyone' and ' all persons ' has been consistently and uniformly 
understood as indicating that marriage is only the union between a man and a woman. 19 There 
are two criticisms of the HRC's interpretation. 
First, the assettion that ' men and women' has been consistently and uniformly understood as 
indicating that marriage is only the union between a man and woman is contrary to the intention 
ofthe drafters and is not indicative of a gender specification in article 23 . Second, applying the 
Vienna Convention att 23 should not be interpreted as excluding same-sex couples. In addition, 
the years that have passed since this decision arguably lessen its relevance. This is because 
many more states have now legislated for same-sex marriage than at the time of the Joslin v 
New Zealand decision including New Zealand, which was the state party in the case. Moreover, 
the ICCPR is a living instrument that should be interpreted and applied in light of present 
circumstances. 
2. 5 Treaty Interpretation 
The HRC's interpretive methodology in Joslin v New Zealand follows a narrow semantic 
reading of atticle 23. This approach falls shott of the comprehensive and established rules of 
treaty interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention. While the interpretive maxims 
codified in ss 31 and 32 are routinely applied by State Patties, there are important reasons why 
non-state actors, such as treaty bodies, should also be guided by these rules. First, treaty body 
opinions are unenforceable. As such, the legitimacy of their decisions relies upon how 
convincingly legal communications are presented, and how readily states accept these opinions 
as authoritative. Utilizing an accepted method of interpretation enables states to trace the logic 
and consistency of treaty body output to and suppott such opinion based on more than pure 
conjecture. Treaty bodies have been criticized for a lack of 'substantial arguments, coherence, 
and analytical rigor; the absence of a visible concept of interpretations; and the existence of 
contradictory remarks by different committee members, which are caused by the absence of a 
principled approach' .2° Following established maxims of interpretation would mediate this 
critique. 
19 Joslin v New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/902/1999 
2°Kerstin Mechlem, 'Treaty Bodies and their Interpretation of Human Rights' (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 905 
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Second, treaty bodies administering human rights instruments have a particular responsibility 
to ensure the enjoyment of treaty rights by the intended beneficiaries of these instruments. 
Treaty bodies, comprising human rights experts, are well placed to provide alternative 
interpretation of human rights instruments to those that might be propounded by a state. 21 It 
can also be said that the HRC's decision in Joslin v New Zealand is inconsistent with a good 
faith interpretation ofthe ICCPR. A good faith interpretation requires not only consideration 
ofthe words ofthe section, but the context, object and purpose of the atticle and the covenant. 
This requirement of a good faith interpretation is consistent with art 5(1) ofthe ICCPR, which 
prevents ' any State, group or person' fl-0111 limiting the rights in the ICCPR to a ' greater extent 
than as stated in the Covenant ' . Arguably, compliance with att 5(1) and a good faith reading 
make it difficult to justifY discriminating against same-sex couples in an instrument that 
emphasizes non-discrimination. 
2.6 The Use ofGendered Language 
The Joslin v New Zealand opinion noted that rut 23 details the only substantive right in the 
ICCPR that uses the term 'men and women ', and concluded that the use of this language 
requires a restrictive interpretation. Making reference to the travaux preparatoires, the HRC 
found that references to 'husband and wife' in the original drafting process of art 23 indicated 
the intentionality of the gender specificity of this article. 22 However, this may be a 
misinterpretation of the drafters' intention if it is considered outside of its historical context. 
The words 'men and women ' in art 23 mirror the wording ofatt 3 ofthe ICCPR, which requires 
State Parties to ' ensure the equal right of men and women' to enjoy all Covenant rights. The 
travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR,23 as cited by the HRC in Joslin v New Zealand, focused 
on the need for gender equality within a marriage, and the prevention of underage or non-
consensual marriages. The reference to 'husband and wife ' in the travaux preparatoires was to 
defend the impottance of including the right to marry in the ICCPR, ' in view of great and unjust 
inequalities that existed as regards to the rights ofhusband and wife ' . The travaux preparatoires 
suggest that the Commission on Human Rights ' should move forward boldly towards the 
realization of the principles of equality '. Thus, the drafting history reveals no intention to 
21 Kerstin Mechlem, 'Treaty Bodies and their Interpretation of Human Rights' (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 22 
22 Joslin v New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/902/ 1999 
23 Economic and Social Council, Report of the 9th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 7 April 1953, 
16th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/689), 78-86. 
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exclude same-sex couples. Rather, gendered language was adopted in order to emphasise the 
principle of equality between men and women. 
Recourse to the travaux preparatoires, in the absence of direct intention, reveals that the drafters 
did not envisage that the right to marry encompassed same sex couples. This is unsurprising, 
given that the drafting of the ICCPR took place in the middle of the last century, while UN 
recognition of sexual orientation as a characteristic protected by non-discrimination provisions 
did not occur until 1994. However, the fact that the drafters of art 23 did not contemplate it 
applying to same-sex couples does not restrict how it should be interpreted and applied today. 
The HRC has emphasised that the ICCPR should be regarded as a living instrument, with the 
rights to be ' applied in context and in the light ofpresent-day conditions' .24 Thus, the words 
' spouse ', and ' men and women' in art 23 should be interpreted in a modern context, where 
sexual orientation is a basis for human rights protection . Moreover, a ' living instrument ' 
approach ought to be applied when interpreting the instrument. 
2. 7 Non-discrimination: ICCPR Articles 2 and 26 
Entirely absent fi·om Joslin v New Zealand is a consideration of how a restrictive reading of 
the right to marry is compatible with the right to non-discrimination in ICCPR arts 2 and 26. 25 
In Joslin v New Zealand, the HRC avoided answering this question by stating that, as no right 
under art 23 had been found , no examination of breaches of other atticles was required . 26 The 
right to non-discrimination is both a self-contained right that demands domestic legal 
protection and a procedural right that applies to every other human right within the covenant. 
Atticle 2 prohibits discrimination in relation to the rights within the ICCPR, while art 26 
provides for equality before the law and equal protection fi·om discrimination by the law. 27 
Importantly, the right to non-discrimination in art 2 is aimed at giving expression to one of the 
basic provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and enshrines a founding principal of the 
UN: to combat discrimination in the world. More attention is devoted to non-discrimination 
than any other category of right in the Charter. While ' discrimination' is not defined in the 
ICCPR, the HRC has elaborated on its substance, stating that discrimination is: any dist inction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
2~ Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 829/1998, 78th sess, UN Doc CCPRIC/78/D/829/ 1998 
5 August 2002 
25 Article 26, International Covenant on Civil and Pol itical Rights 
26 Joslin v New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/75/D/902/ 1999 
27 Article 2, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, propetiy, bitth or other 
status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and fJ-eedoms. 28 It is 
now well established that the grounds protected by the nondiscrimination provisions of the 
ICCPR apply to sexual orientation. In Toonen v Australia, the HRC held that sexual orientation 
is included in the class of'sex' for purposes of arts 2 and 26.29 The HRC may have ' arrived at 
the right conclusion via the wrong avenue', 30 as 'other status' is the more appropriate 
classification, since it allows for a clear delit1eation between sex (as it relates to gender) and 
sexual orientation. The CESCR has noted that, u_nder the ICESCR's identical non-
discrimination provision, sexual orientation is recognized under 'other status'. 31 In General 
Comment No 18 on non-discrimination, the HRC noted that equal treatment does not mean 
identical treatment; however, it went on to state that 'the covenant is explicit' about the areas 
where this principle applies (for example the segregation ofjuvenile offenders from adults in 
art 10(3)).32 The HRC also stated that differential treatment 'will not constitute discrimination 
if the criteria for such differentiation are "reasonable and objective'". The HRC has not applied 
this as a strict test, and its decision about what amounts to reasonableness and objectivity 
depends largely on the cit·cumstances. If the HRC was to consider the question of non-
discrimination in relation to same-sex marriage, it would first determine whether the grounds 
for discrimination are direct or it1direct, and whether such discrimination was ' reasonable and 
objective'. Direct discrimination requires an element of intention; the intended outcome of the 
rule or action is to discriminate. Indirect discrimination- via seemingly neutral laws that may 
have an effect, rather than an intention or purpose, to discriminate- is increasingly recognized 
by the HRC. 33 Indirect discritnit1ation breaches the ICCPR 'ifthe detrimental effects of a rule 
or decision exclusively or dispropottionately affect persons having a particular ... sex ... or 
28 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination, 37th sess, UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/l/Rev. l , 10 November 1989,7 
29 Toonen V Australia 
30 Sarah Joseph , 'Toonen v Australia: Gay Rights under the !CCPR' (1994) University ofTasmania Law Review 
392 
31 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 20: Non-Discrimination in 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 42nd sess, UN Doc E/C.l2/GC/20 (25 May 2009) [32] 
32 General Comment No 18, UN Doc HR.I/GEN/11Rev.1 , 8 
33 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 208/ 1986, 37th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/37/D/208/ 1986 
9 November 1989 ('Kamel Singh Bhinder v Canada'). 
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other status'. When domestic laws intend to explicitly prohibit the marriage of same-sex 
couples, or to prevent recognition of same-sex marriages so lenmized in another country, the 
grounds for discrimination may be direct. Additionally, laws that are neutral as to the gender 
composition of marriage, but are implemented so as to prohibit same-sex couples from 
marrying, also contain grounds for direct discrimination. Laws that permit the marriage of 
opposite-sex couples, without revealing intent to prevent the marriage of same-sex couples, 
may contain indirect grounds of discrimination. Laws containing grounds of direct and indirect 
discrimination may not be discriminatory if such laws are based on reasonable and objective 
criteria. However, it is difficult to conceive of reasonable and objective criteria for such 
differential treatment that the HRC would fmd acceptable. Marriage laws based on the 
protection of public morals may not satisfy a reasonable and objective requirement. The HRC 
has noted that 'limitations .. . for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles 
not deriving exclusively fi·om a single tradition ' . As such, laws based on the principles of a 
single religious or cultural tradition may still be classed as discrimination under the ICCPR. 
Further, the HRC has indicated that same-sex attraction, in and of itself, is not a ground on 
which a state may justify the protection of the 'morals, health, rights and legitimate interests of 
minors ', as opposed to heterosexuality or sexuality generally. 34 By extension, should a 
communication be brought to the HRC claiming discrimination on the basis of laws preventing 
same-sex marriage, it could be difficult for the HRC to uphold laws that justify discrimination 
on the basis of either the morality of sexual orientation or the purported harm that formalizing 
same-sex relationships might pose to a society. Restrictive marriage laws based on a criterion 
ain1ed at the protection of children will find little traction as to being 'objective and reasonable ' , 
given the irrefutable medical and psychological consensus that same-sex relationships pose no 
greater threat either to the individuals involved or children ofthose individuals than opposite-
sex relationships. Thus, it seems unlikely there is a reasonable and objective criterion that 
would satisfy the HRC that restrictive marriage laws were not discriminatory against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation. The global shift ofthe international community, 
and the UN, towards recognizing LGBTI rights, discussed below, futther decreases the 
plausibility of such an argument being accepted by the HRC. 
3 ~ Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 1932/20 I 0, I 06th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/1 06/D/ 1932/20 10, 31 October 2012, ('Fedotova v Russian Federation') 
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2.8 Same-sex Marriage or Civil Unions- The Legal Status of Same-sex Parents and 
Families 
Civil unions, registered partnerships, and other forms of relationship recognition are often 
raised as ' alternatives' to marriage in marriage equality discourses. The CESCR noted in 
General Comment No 20 that ' eliminating forma l discrimination requires ensuring that a 
State's constitution, laws and policy documents do not discriminate on prohibited grounds' and 
that 'discrimination must be eliminated both formally and substantively ' .35 Similarly, the HRC 
noted in General Conunent No 18 that there is an obligation on State Parties to 'diminish or 
eliminate conditions which cause or help perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the 
Covenant ' . The distinction between marriage and civil unions delineates opposite-sex couples 
from same-sex couples, reinforcing prejudice against LGBTI people and maintaining the 
stigma historically associated with homosexuality. 36 While proponents of civil unions may 
emphasize that this ceremony holds equal status to marriage, civil unions, as a relatively new 
institution, are still viewed by many as not holding equal cultural significance to marriage. The 
level of public engagement and debate surrounding the question of whether marriage rights 
should include same-sex couples signifies the high value and status associated with marriage.37 
Proponents of an 'equal' but different relationship recognition for same-sex couples echo 
sentiments of America ' s infamous 'separate but equal ' doctrine. As a result, affording same-
sex couples only civil unions may exacerbate or, worse, institutionalize discrimination. 38 
35 General Comment No 20, UN Doc E/C.12/GC/20, 
36
) < https://www.apa.org/aboutlpolicy/same-sex.aspx accessed on 3rd January 2018 
37 Gregory M Herek, 'Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A Social Science 
Perspective' American Psychologist, 2006, 607 
38 Adiva Sifri s and Paula Gerber, 'Same-sex Marriage in Australia: A Battleground for Equality' (2011 ) 25(2) 
Australian Journal of Family Law 96. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EUROPEAN UNION COMPARATIVE STUDY 
3.1 Introduction 
The shot1 story, Love on Trial, nominated for the 2012 Caine Prize for Afi·ican Literature, 
illustrates the carrot-and-stick effects of Western countries exercising their normative power. 
Therein, European states restrict aid to Malawi because ofthe conviction and imprisonment of 
a gay Malawian for homosexuality. While a work of fiction, this tale exposes the contemporary 
realities that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex rights are not only a growing 
concern within the European Union, but also an influence on the EU's external relations. 
Moreover, it depicts the EU's rising role as a global normative power, and the ensuing clash of 
conflicting social values. The question of the effectiveness and nature of the ED's approach to 
LGBTI rights in Non-EU countries invariably arises. Herein, comparisons shall be made 
between the EU 's approach to LGBTI rights in states that are candidates (or potential 
candidates) for EU membership, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and other states. In 
addition to that, the EU 's approach to LGBTI rights shall be analysed alongside that of the 
United Nations. Despite the problems present in the EU's approach, the EU is the most 
effective intergovernmental organization in suppot1ing LGBTI rights, and its practices are most 
effective in regulating the application of such rights in candidate countries and countries that 
are deemed to be potential candidates to the EU. 
Toonen v. Australia39 was the first case to bring sexual orientation into the UN's human 
rights system. While later cases, such as Young v. Australia 40and Joslin et al v. New 
Zealand, influenced the Human Rights Committee's attitude towards LGBTI rights and 
involved the interpretation of international treaty provisions as being in favour of non-
discrimination against sexual minorities, they did not override the resistance of many UN 
39 Toonen v. Australia, CCPR/C/50/D/488/ 1992, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), 4 April 1994, 
<http://www.refworld .org/docicl/48298b8d2. html>, accessed 22 May 2013 
40 Young v. Australia, Comm. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. A/58/40, Vol. II, at 231 (HRC 
2003),http ://\\IV>V. worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisi ons/2003.08.06 Youn g v Ausn·alia.htm , accessed 22 May 
2013 
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member-states against LGBTI rights. Due to the UN's lack of the supranational authority in 
this area, decisions ofthe Human Rights Committee have accomplished little more, in terms 
of real rights for LGBTI persons worldwide, than act as a show ofsuppott. Homosexuality 
remains illegal in 76 countries worldwide, most of whom are member-states of the United 
Nations, and discrimination against LGBTI persons is widespread even in states that have 
not banned homosexuality. Opposition from religious-affiliated bodies such as the Holy See 
and the Organization ofislamic States curbs eff01ts to progress LGBTI rights within the UN, 
as is evident in the treatment of Brazil's draft resolution on LGBTI rights in 2003.41 In 
addition to that, the inclusion of sexual orientation as a source of universal rights jeopardizes 
a UN consensus due to the fact that it is culturally divisive. 42 
3.2 The European Union's Approach to LGBTQI Rights 
In contrast with the UN's lack of efficacy in securing LGBTI rights amongst its member-
states lies the EU's policies. The European Parliament, as a whole, has demonstrated 
solidarity with sexual minorities, condemned discrimination, and promoted LGBTI rights in 
Non-EU states through resolutions such as the European Parliament resolution of 9 June 
2011 on the EU-Russia summit (2012/C380 E/15), the European Parliament resolution of 17 
February 2011 on Uganda: the killing ofDavid Kato (2012/C 188 E/14), and the European 
Parliament resolution of 28 September 2011 on human rights, sexual orientation and gender 
identity at the United Nations (2013/C 56 E/12). Moreover, attempts at enslu·ining LGBTI 
rights in international law through UN General Assembly resolutions were begun by EU 
member states (France and the Netherlands) in 2008, and backed by the EU. Member states 
of the EU have been the largest bloc supp01ting LGBTI rights in the UN.43 Moreover, the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) stated in its 
annual review for 2013 that the European Union has increased its suppott for LGBTI rights 
in its e>.1:ernal policy, despite failing to harmonize its internal policy on that 
41 Ignacio Saiz, ' Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation: A Decade of Development and 
Denial at the UN' (2004) 7(2)Health and Human Rights 57 
42 Ignacio Saiz, 'Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation: A Decade of Development and 
Denial at the UN' (2004) 7(2)Health and Human Rights 57 
43 'Annual Review for the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in 
Europe', (ILGA-Europe, 2013) <https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/15?4513l /2013.pdt> accessed 22 May 
2013 
18 
matter.44 Furthermore, the European Parliament is seeking to transform the EU's LGBT 
toolkit, a document adopted in 2010 which establishes guidelines for the EU's promotion of 
LGBTI right internationally, into binding guidelines on the basis that the EU's relationship 
with Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific group of states also involves non-discrimination. 45 Such 
solidarity in support may be attributed to Article 10 ofthe Treaty on the Functioning ofthe 
European Union, which establishes the EU's goal of fighting against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, and Article 19 TFEU, which suppotts efforts by Member States 
of the EU to combat discrin1ination on the ground of sexual orientation, amongst other laws. 
The 1993 Copenhagen criteria ensures that states attempting to join the EU implement all 
its human rights legislation, including those supporting LGBTI rights. This has led to 
considerable development in LGBT[ rights in states, such as Turkey, which wish to join 
the EU. The criteria requires the following : the prohibition of significant discrimination 
of sexual minorities in the national penal codes; the transposition into national legislation 
of the EU's anti-discrimination acquis; and the respect, without discrimination, of 
fundamental rights, including the right to fi·eedom of assembly, the right to freedom of 
association and the right to freedom fi·om violence. An example of the positive effect of 
the EU's insistence that non-EU states, trying to join Union, can be seen in the situation of 
Romania, which prior of its accession provided less protection to its sexual minorities than 
the European Union, and since 2007 went on to ensure higher levels of protection those 
required by the EU, including more extensive prohibitions against discrimination of 
LGBTI persons outside the workplace.46 Progress in the sphere of LGBTI rights m 
countries that are still currently candidates, or potential candidates, to the EU can be noted 
in the EU Conunission's annual progress repotts. The 2007 Conunission Progress Reports 
for Turkey and Serbia showed significant attention given, by the governments of those 
specific states, to promoting LGBTI rights in the ir countries when compared to previous 
years. Advocacy groups note that unless the EU Commission specifically 
addresses discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in its Progress Repotis, the 
44 'Annual Review for the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in 
Europe', (ILGA-Europe, 20 13) <hnps://dl.dropboxusercontenr. com/u/ 15245131 /20 l3.pdt> accessed 22 May 
45 'Annual Review for the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in 
Europe', (ILGA-Europe, 2013) <https://dl.dropboxusercontent. com/u/ 15245131 /20 13.pdt> accessed 22 May 
46 lreen Dubel and Andre Hiekelma, Urgency Reqired: Gay and Lesbian Rights are Human Rights (Humanist 
Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries, 2010) 275 
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acceding countries tend to disregard LGBTI rights, or remain stagnant, in the following 
yearsYThis clearly shows the level of influence that the EU has of policies regarding 
LGBTI rights in such countries. A comparison between the 2013 report and 2012 report, 
of ILGA, reveals increases, on the level of respect for LGBTI rights, of 24% in Croatia 
and 8% in Montenegro, both countries in which EU pressure has been a major catalyst for 
progress.48 
The EU promotes LGBTI rights within its Neighbourhood Policy chiefly tlu·ough its 
Action Plans with various members of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Although 
there is no system of punishments or direct sanctions to be enacted by the EU when a state 
does not abide by its Action Plan, the incentives for adhering to the Action Plans encourage 
supp01t for LGBTI rights from members of the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Moreover, continued transgressions against the Action Plan usually leads to a severing of 
ties between the EU and the state. Such is the current state of affairs between the EU and 
Belarus, whose lack of democracy and poor human rights records (in a variety of areas, 
includiJ:lg LGBTI rights) hampered its relationship with the EU. On the other hand, lies the 
ED-Moldova Action Plan.49 Although it only contained a provision supporting the rights 
of minorities (without specifications of whether such a provision included sexual 
minorities), pressure from the EU has led to the Moldovan formulating anti-discrimination 
legislation and promising to develop laws that adhere to EU standards. More recently, the 
European Commission has stated that were Ukraine to adopt its Draft Law 8711, which 
criminalizes the 'promotion of homosexuality' , the prospects ofvisa liberalization, entailed 
in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalization, would be jeopardized since Draft 
Law 8711 stands in contradiction to the requirements of the necessary standards of the 
Action Plan. 50 However, it must be, likewise, noted that LGBTI rights often are not a 
47Ireen Dubel and Andre Hiekelma, Urgency Reqired: Gqy and Lesbian Rights are Human Rights (Humanist 
Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries, 20 I 0) 275 
48 < http://w\vw.ilga-europe.orQ/home/publicationsfrcpon s and other materials/rainbow europe> accessed 22 
May 2013 
49 Ireen Dubel and Andre Hiekelma, Urgency Reqired: Gqy and Lesbian Rights are Human Rights (Humanist 
Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries, 20 I 0) 279 
50 'Annual Review for the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian , Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in 
Europe', (lLGA-Europe, 2013) <https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/ 15245131 /2013.pdf> accessed 22 May 
2013 
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priority within the EU's Action Plans with member of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
and must compete against other relevant affairs, such as economic development, 
democracy, political stability and regional security. Members of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy who still maintain positive relations with the European Union 
include states such as Jordan, which voted against the General Assembly declarations 
supporting LGBTI rights and a Human Rights Council resolution (AIHRC/17/L.9/Rev.1) 
that sought to offer protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
This situation is similar to that of the European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2010 
on Uganda: the so-called "Bahati bill" and discrimination against the LGBT population 
(2012/C 169 E/16), and the European Parliament resolution of 17 February 2011 on 
Uganda: the killing of David Kato (2012/C 188 E/14) wherein the EU did little else but 
condemn the discrimination against sexual minorities in Uganda, despite public outcry for 
sanctions. Such a statement issued by the European Union represents more support and 
solidarity for LGBTI rights than one issued by any other inter-governmental organization, 
chiefly because the EU' s supp01t represented all the Member-States while that ofthe UN 
would have been fragmented due to internal divisions and conflicts regarding LGBTI 
rights. Although it remains a much less effective form of support for LGBTI rights than 
that that the EU has demonstrated when interacting with candidate countries and potential 
candidates, this is more likely due to the nature of the EU's relationship with such states 
rather than unwillingness on the pmt of the EU to take more effective measures. 
3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the EU has demonstrated itself, tlu·ough a variety of means, to be the most 
effective intergovernmental organization in supporting LGBTI rights in Non-EU countries, its 
methods being especially efficient in regulating the application of such rights in candidate 
countries. Though problems exist in its level of, and ability to, supp01t LGBTI rights in non-
EU countries, the EU demonstrates growing concern for the protection of sexual minorities. 
The way forward for the EU' s supportofLGBTI rights should involve greater support for local 
human rights defenders and activists in the intended countries. The importance of this pa1tly 
arises fi·om the increasingly prevalent discourse in many African, Asian and Latin American 
countries that attributes homosexuality as a negative Western import. This has been exploited 
by governments, politicians and religious organizations to manipulate public opinion in their 
favour and distract from dilemmas that would have been, otherwise, prioritized in the media, 
21 
and other mediums of public discourse. Tlu·ough local human rights defenders and activists, 
EU supp01t for LGBTI rights can be tailored to the particular needs and cultural sensitivities 
of local populations, including by highlighting indigenous traditions through which same-sex 
sexual activity and partnerships manifested, or monitoring changing social values amongst 
younger generations. Lastly, it is chiefly through suppotting local activists and human rights 
defenders, that negative social attitudes towards sexual minorities and LGBTI rights may be 
changed, leading to civil society pressure in such countries on the governments, of such 
countries, to in1plement LGBTI rights, whether on national levels by decriminalizing 
homosexuality and banning discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender 
identity, or on the international scale by supporting universal LGBTI rights through the United 
Nations or regional organizations. 
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CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
4.1 Restating the inWal problem 
At1icle 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains an express right 
to marry. Thus far this disset1ation has analyzed this provision, other United Nations human 
rights treaties, and relevant jurisprudence to determine whether a11 23 applies to same-sex 
couples. Currently the only authoritative interpretation of at1 23 remains Joslin v New Zealand 
where the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that the aforementioned provision 
does not apply to same-sex couples. However, that decision is more than 12 years old and 
arguably would not be decided in the same way should a similar case come before the Human 
Rights Committee in the future. Using the principles of treaty interpretation, this legal paper 
attempts to assert that Joslin v New Zealand is no longer good law, and proposes that the right 
to marry should be interpreted in a non-discriminatory manner and should not be restricted 
exclusively to opposite-sex couples. This dissertation also attempts to start a dialogue about 
the human right to marry's intersectionality with and indivisibility from other human r ights. In 
this fmal section it will suggests new, progressive ways of interpreting the norms of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child as they relate to the human right to marry. 
4.2 Research Findings 
4.2.1 The interpretation abided by in Joslin v Nevv Zealand is discriminatory 
"All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights." 
In 2012, the UN Human Rights Office released its first major work on LGBTI human rights, a 
report entitled Born Free and Equal, which was followed by the 2013-14 awareness-raising 
campaign on LGBTI rights under the same name. 51 Should the HRC be confronted with another 
individual communication concerning the right of same-sex couples to marry, it seems likely 
that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples, as in Joslin v New Zealand, would be far less 
defensible. If forced to consider the right to non-discrimination in relation to marriage, the 
HRC' s opinion may reflect the growing consensus that marriage should be open to all couples 
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regardless of gender composition. Commentators suggest that a 'global tipping point' is rapidly 
approaching, and that, should a similar case to Joslin v New Zealand be brought before the 
HRC, there may well be a different outcome. Even though HRC opinions are only quasi-
judicial, the jurisprudence that emerges is widely utilised as the authoritative interpretation of 
the ICCPR. As a result, while strong arguments can be made that art 23 should be interpreted 
to include same-sex couples, until an HRC opinion reflects this, it is not possible to asse1i that 
international human rights law presently provides a right for same-sex couples to marry. 
4.2.2 Progress towards marriage equality that is apparent in the national laws of multiple 
states is not being replicated in International Law 
There is a growing trend for Western states to recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry. 
Although the actual number of countries that have marriage equality is relatively small 
compared to , for example, the number of countries that still criminalize homosexual conduct,52 
it has been estimated that 10 per cent ofthe world 's population now live in countries where 
same-sex couples can marry. Progress towards marriage equality at the domestic level is not 
being replicated within international human rights law, and the 2002 decision in Joslin v New 
Zealand remains the only UN authority regarding the application of art 23 of the ICCPR to 
same-sex couples. However, the growing international climate of supp01t for LGBTI human 
rights generally, and same-sex marriage in pmticular, makes it likely that the question of 
whether same-sex couples have a right to marry will come before a UN treaty body again in 
the future . Since the HRC 's decision in Joslin v New Zealand, the UN treaty body system has 
increasingly defended the rights of LGBTI people in its General Comments, Concluding 
Observations and Views on individual communications. Further, the UN Human Rights 
Office's prominent Born Free and Equal campaign, launched in 2013, fi.1rther emphasizes the 
UN's stance as a champion ofLGBTI human rights. An individual communication concerning 
a prohibition on same-sex couples marrying would not necessarily have to come before the 
HRC. 
4.3 Conclusion and Recommendations 
As this disse1tation has demonstrated, denying same-sex couples the right to marry may 
constitute a breach of the ICESCR and the CRC. Now that the conunittees that monitor these 
24 
two treaties have the jurisdiction to receive individual communications, a same-sex couple, a 
same-sex attracted youth, or a child with same-sex parents could bring a claim of discrimination 
arising fi·om restrictive marriage laws. Such a communication could lead to the relevant treaty 
committee finding that marriage laws excluding same-sex couples breach the applicable treaty, 
and should therefore be amended to remove any discrimination based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity. 
Such a decision would be consistent with the recent trend of the UN recognizing that LGBTI 
persons enjoy the same fundamental, equal and inalienable human rights as all people. The 
recognition of the rights of gender-diverse people has long been coupled with the rights of 
same-sex attracted people in the 'LGBTI' acronym. The rights of transgender people are 
recognized by the UN as human rights, despite the gender-specific wording of some human 
rights articles. Any moves towards recognizing marriage equality within international human 
rights law should extend protection to gender-diverse people as well as people of all sexual 
orientations. Such a non-discriminatory approach would ensure that transgender and 
transsexual, gender-diverse and intersex people are covered by this human right. Wording of 
national legislation that uses gender-neutral terms, such as ' married couple' and 'spouse' , 
promotes such inclusion. 
The global understanding of human rights and their application has developed and matured in 
the 70 years since their fu·st inception. The treaties, as living instruments, should be interpreted 
and applied to include all people, regardless of their sexual orientation, gender identity or 
gender expression. States may struggle to justifY their prohibition of same-sex marriage on 
objective and reasonable grounds in light of the UN consensus that the rights of all people are 
the same. Consistency in the application ofthe principle of non-discrimination, in light ofthe 
understanding of LGBTI rights as human rights, suggests that the right to marry should be 
interpreted as a human right for all. 
Lastly, seeing as this disse1tation has establishes that there exists a growing trend for Western 
states to recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry, the idea of whether the right to same 
sex marriage exists in customary international law would be a plausible area of research. It 
still remains that the actual number of countries that have marriage equality is relatively small 
compared to, for example, the number of countries that still criminalize homosexual conduct. 
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